Netanyahu's 'Unity' Gambit Is a Stalling Operation Disguised as Statecraft

Netanyahu needs Eisenkot more than Eisenkot needs Netanyahu. The coalition math, the caretaker clock, and the ultra-Orthodox wildcard all point to one question: who runs out of time first.

Israel's coalition formation period is, as former peace negotiator Daniel Levy puts it, about "spin and distortion and trying to gain leverage." Netanyahu's Saturday video appeal for unity with opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot is a textbook example. The caretaker prime minister framed a power-sharing arrangement as existential — claiming Iran "would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against us" — while the man who actually holds the mandate to form a government called it a "bluff."

The arithmetic is stark. Eisenkot's four-party bloc holds 48 seats. Netanyahu's right-wing and religious bloc holds 53. Neither commands the 61-seat majority needed to govern alone. The two Palestinian-led factions — the Joint List and Ra'am — hold a combined 19 seats, a record. Together with Eisenkot's bloc, that reaches 67, six more than needed. But the coalition within the coalition is where it fractures: Avigdor Lieberman of Yisrael Beiteinu and Naftali Bennett of Together refuse to rely on Arab parties, despite both having served in the 2021 government that included Ra'am. The most likely path, according to analysts, runs through the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, which would bring Eisenkot's bloc to exactly 61. But this route has its own poison pill: United Torah Judaism reportedly demands a written commitment from all 48 Eisenkot bloc lawmakers to exempt yeshiva students from military service and shield the exemption from judicial review. Both Eisenkot and Lieberman oppose this, making the deal structurally fragile even before it is struck. Netanyahu's incentive structure is transparent. He does not need to form a government — he needs to prevent Eisenkot from forming one. As researcher Yasser Manna told Al Jazeera, "Preventing Eisenkot from forming one may be enough to preserve his position temporarily." The caretaker role keeps Netanyahu in office, retains his security prerogatives, and gives him time to exploit divisions among Eisenkot's partners. The unity pitch is the vehicle for this delay, not a genuine governance proposal. Eisenkot's deadline is December 6, extendable to December 20. Every day Netanyahu can consume in performative negotiations is a day closer to that clock running out. The Tuesday vote to replace Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana with Yashar lawmaker Matan Kahana is the first real test — Eisenkot has explicitly challenged Netanyahu and Smotrich to back the move, framing their response as a sincerity signal. Manna raises the wildcard scenario: a security crisis. A renewed large-scale confrontation could shift coalition dynamics in unpredictable directions — either pressuring all parties toward unity or generating new fractures over military decision-making authority. Netanyahu, still commanding the caretaker apparatus, would be positioned to shape the crisis narrative. This is the structural danger of a caretaker prime minister with strong incentives to avoid losing power. Levy outlines the endgame if Eisenkot's primary options fail: force his allies to choose between accepting Palestinian-party support or leaving Netanyahu in office, or form a short-lived government whose sole purpose is removing Netanyahu and triggering new elections. The second option would be a governing arrangement with a shelf life measured in months — less a government than a controlled demolition of Netanyahu's position.