Sudan has formally accused Ethiopia of allowing the Rapid Support Forces to launch waves of armed drone attacks from Ethiopian soil — 70 separate assaults involving 187 one-way attack drones between February and October, according to a Sudanese foreign ministry and military intelligence report. The frequency is accelerating: 28 attacks deploying 97 drones in October alone. The Sudanese government lodged complaints with both the UN Security Council and the African Union's Peace and Security Council. The toll is staggering and overwhelmingly civilian. Between mid-February and late October, drone strikes killed 176 Sudanese soldiers and 484 civilians. Over 90 percent of power stations in SAF-controlled Sudanese cities have been rendered inoperable. A single attack on displaced families in Wad el-Mahi on October 3 killed 26 women and four children. Another in Nyala on October 26 killed at least 21 and injured 40. UN Secretary-General Guterres called the drone campaign appalling. The Sudanese Transitional Sovereignty Council identified specific launch sites: Asosa Airport in western Ethiopia, the Kurmuk-Gizen border area, and the Bahir Dar airbase in the Amhara region. The technological profile of the drones — long range, high destructive power, capable of reaching nearly all Sudanese territory — points to external state-level backing, according to border affairs specialist Abdul Kareem Al-Almin Ahmed. Ethiopia denies the allegations and counter-accuses Sudan of backing TPLF-linked rebels. The drone file sits atop older fault lines. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute has kept Sudan and Ethiopia at odds for years, with downstream Sudan and Egypt viewing the dam as a national security threat. Sudan's deepening alignment with Cairo sharpens the antagonism. Ethiopia's alleged RSF support adds a live military dimension to what was already a strategic rivalry over Nile water resources and regional influence. Internally, the drone campaign is splitting the Sudanese military establishment. Hardliners within the SAF and allied forces are demanding a formal declaration of war against Ethiopia. But cooler heads recognize the arithmetic: the SAF is already stretched thin fighting the RSF across southeastern Sudan. Opening a second front against a better-resourced Ethiopian military with extensive border access would be strategically suicidal. As Al-Almin put it, Sudan would be fighting on two fronts simultaneously — one against an internal paramilitary, one against a conventional army. Ethiopia faces its own constraints. Khartoum's interest, as conflict resolution expert Badr Hassan Al-Shafei argues, lies in eastern border stability. Escalation risks triggering mass displacement that border states cannot absorb, compounding the 13 million already displaced by the SAF-RSF war. Both capitals recognize the catastrophic potential of expanding the battlefield — which is the only thing currently preventing it. The result is a deeply unstable equilibrium: mutual exhaustion masquerading as restraint. Ethiopia uses RSF proxy pressure; Sudan uses TPLF proxy pressure. Civilians on both sides of the border pay the price. The drone escalation — industrial in scale, with nearly 100 weapons in a single month — suggests the equilibrium is degrading faster than either side can manage.
