Israel approaches its general election on the third anniversary of the October 7, 2023 attacks with a paradox that defines the entire contest: by most conventional military metrics, the country is safer than it has been in years, yet its electorate feels more vulnerable than before the Hamas-led assault that killed over 1,200 people and triggered a war that has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians in Gaza. The objective ledger is real. Hamas's military capabilities are severely diminished. Hezbollah is struggling to hold territory in southern Lebanon. Bashar al-Assad has been ousted from Syria. Iran's economy and military are described by analysts as hugely depleted and preoccupied with its own conflict with the United States. The Houthis in Yemen, once launching rockets at Israeli targets, are now focused on fighting government forces and firing at Saudi cities. As Israeli security analyst Ahron Bregman of King's College London puts it: "Hamas is beaten, though not destroyed; the same with Hezbollah, while dealing with Iran is done mainly by the United States. There are forward buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria." But October 7 shattered something that military operations cannot rebuild: the public's faith in the intelligence and security apparatus that for generations had been the pride of the Israeli political establishment. Ayala Panievsky of City St George's, University of London, frames the mood directly: "To this day, Israelis do not feel safe from future attacks by Hamas or Hezbollah, or a nuclear threat from Iran. None of these fronts ended in a win for Israel. Despite Trump's and Netanyahu's big promises, none of these threats was eliminated." The closer threat is domestic. Bregman warns that an emboldened settler movement and intensified military operations have made the occupied West Bank a tinderbox, with Israel having "lost control over the settlers who provoke the Palestinians on a daily basis." He sees a third Palestinian Intifada on the horizon. This is the gap between the military map and the lived reality — buffer zones in Lebanon and Syria do not address combustion building within Israel's own boundaries. Both frontrunners — Netanyahu and Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot — exploit this insecurity rather than resolve it. Netanyahu simultaneously claims to have "rewritten the political geography of the Middle East" and "saved the State of Israel from destruction," framing every achievement as proof that the threat remains existential. In July, he hinted at a "forever wars" scenario. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has claimed Hamas is rearming and training for another massacre. No major opposition figure has been willing to challenge the threat narrative head-on. Ben Gurion University sociologist Lev Grinberg identifies what is actually being contested: "The question of security or insecurity is a political question, not a question of Israel's military capacities." Israeli society is deeply divided between the government coalition and those opposing it. Broad media coverage of reports that Netanyahu received intelligence from the UAE before October 7 — denied by both parties — and his refusal to hold an independent inquiry into pre-attack failures have become electoral ammunition. The stakes for both camps are personal as much as political. Netanyahu likely fears that losing would strengthen the corruption case against him. The opposition fears an emboldened Netanyahu if he wins. As Grinberg observes: "After the approaching elections, the losing camp will feel very insecure. There already is an atmosphere of terror for the opposition." The security discourse has been fully captured by domestic political competition — a self-reinforcing loop where insecurity is the product, not the problem to be solved.
