Since the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026, the country's population has lived under a pattern familiar to anyone who has watched great powers project force: the schedule of violence is set by the aggressor's domestic calendar, not by any military logic the target can anticipate. Two elections — Israeli legislative polls on October 27 and US midterms on November 3 — now function as de facto ceasefire timers. A June memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran produced a sharp decrease in strikes, but political commentators and ordinary Iranians alike expect the pause to expire once votes are counted. The Israeli political spectrum offers Iran no exit. Netanyahu's government has bombed Iranian energy facilities, bridges, and civilian infrastructure. Defence Minister Israel Katz has publicly stated his goal of sending Iran "back into the Stone Age." But the opposition — Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, Golan — has cheered every strike. They differ from Netanyahu only on method, not objective: all want Iran's enriched uranium removed, its nuclear programme dismantled, and the "axis of resistance" eliminated. Eisenkot explicitly praised Trump's decision to attack Iran as "courageous" while arguing that regime change must ultimately come from Iranians themselves. The election is a contest over tactics, not aims. Trump's leverage is layered. A naval blockade of Iran's southern ports since July has halted oil exports and disrupted trade. Sanctions described as among the most stringent ever imposed on any country have made Iranians measurably poorer and more isolated. Trump has threatened to bring about the "death of a civilisation" and suggested Iran's map may look different after the war. US media report that military assets are positioned to strike within days if ordered. The blockade and the bombs are complementary tools; neither requires the other to inflict damage. Iranian public opinion has shifted in ways that complicate every actor's narrative. Some Iranians initially welcomed external pressure on the Islamic Republic, which has controlled the country since 1979. But as Shayan, a 32-year-old Tehran resident, told Al Jazeera, the targeting of oil, gas, power, and steel infrastructure — things people need to live — has corroded that support. "I think most Iranians don't have a choice in the matter, but want some stability and peace." Iranian authorities have labelled pro-Israeli citizens "homeland sellers" and punish perceived cooperation under national security charges, while blaming the US and Israel entirely for January's nationwide protests in which thousands of civilians are believed to have been killed. The UN says Iranian security forces committed crimes against humanity during the crackdown. The information environment is deliberately poisoned on all sides. Cyber intelligence operations by Israel and Iran make it impossible to gauge online sentiment reliably. Iranian authorities have threatened further internet and communication shutdowns. Citizens have resorted to establishing informal early-warning groups — friends in different cities who text each other when they hear fighter jets overhead. Some use domestic messaging apps since international platforms may go dark. The structural dynamic is stark: two countries with elections decide when and whether to bomb a third country whose population has no vote in the matter. The costs — destroyed infrastructure, economic strangulation, civilian deaths, protest crackdowns — are borne entirely by Iranians. The benefits — electoral positioning, deterrence credibility, regional realignment — accrue to politicians in Tel Aviv and Washington. Whether Netanyahu or Eisenkot wins changes the rhetoric, not the trajectory. Whether Republicans or Democrats gain seats in the US midterms may modulate Trump's timeline but not his stated objectives. As a user named Ali wrote on X: "In all seriousness, 90 million people have our eyes to the sky to see when there will be war. Damn this life we've lived." That sentence contains more analytical clarity than most policy papers on the conflict. The agency deficit is the story.
