Eight months after the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran beginning February 28, the domestic power struggle between hardliners and moderates has escalated into an open factional war fought in parliament, in the streets, and on state television. The Paydari Front — a well-organized hardline bloc with deep roots in parliament, municipal government, religious networks, and media — has formally asked Iran's parliament and the Supreme National Security Council to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursue nuclear weapons "as quickly as possible." This is not a marginal provocation. It is a direct challenge to the diplomatic track President Masoud Pezeshkian has tried to keep alive. The hardliners' tactical toolkit is substantial. MP Amirhossein Sabeti, aligned with the Paydari Front, has stated negotiations cannot begin unless the US siege on Iran's southern ports or sanctions end. The faction has filed an impeachment motion against Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi following his UN General Assembly visit to New York. Parliament is considering a law to criminalize interviews with foreign media — a move that would choke off the moderate camp's international messaging channels. For 200 consecutive nights, organized rallies in major Iranian cities have evolved from patriotic gatherings into hardline political operations with slogans like "Negotiating with the enemy is a betrayal of the homeland." The moderate camp's argument is strategic, not sentimental. Journalist Davood Heshmati, considered close to Pezeshkian, told Al Jazeera there are signs the US has abandoned regime-change ambitions for more modest war aims — a shift that makes a diplomatic off-ramp more realistic. His framing is pointed: "Those who say the Strait of Hormuz must not be reopened are people who believe the war must not end." The moderates want to test every alternative to continued war before capitulating to the hardline logic that force is the only language Washington understands. But the decisive structural insight comes from political analyst Negar Mortazavi: the hardliners are powerful enough to complicate diplomacy but not powerful enough to stop it. Decisions about war, peace, and negotiations are made at the level of Supreme Leader Mujtaba Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council — above both factions. Mortazavi notes the historical precedent is clear. The hardliners could not stop the JCPOA under Obama, and they could not stop the more recent memorandum of understanding with Trump. "Ultimately, the decisions were made above their heads." The Strait of Hormuz closure, the massive infrastructure damage across Iran and Arab states, and the disruption to global energy supplies form the material backdrop to this factional struggle. Iran's economy is crumbling, which strengthens the moderate argument for a negotiated end but also fuels hardline rage at perceived capitulation. The Paydari Front's NPT withdrawal demand is less a policy proposal than a loyalty test — a way to make any diplomatic engagement politically expensive for Pezeshkian's camp. The delayed scheduling of Araghchi's impeachment hearing is the tell. If the hardliners had the votes and the backing from above, the hearing would already be done. The delay, alongside continued diplomatic engagement with mediators, suggests the Supreme Leader's office is keeping the diplomatic channel open while allowing the hardliners to vent. This is managed factional competition, not a genuine contest for control of foreign policy. The 20-year question is whether this pattern holds. If the hardliners cannot block deals but can raise their political cost high enough, the long-term effect is a diplomacy deficit — fewer Iranian officials willing to engage internationally, a shrinking moderate bench, and an institutional culture that punishes negotiation. Even when you lose every battle, you can win the war of attrition against the people willing to talk.
