Sheikh Ekrima Sabri, head of the Higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem, has been barred from Al-Aqsa Mosque for more than two years. His fifth exclusion order, issued October 20, extends the ban until April 2027. His original offence: a sermon mourning Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, assassinated by Israel. Sabri is not an outlier — he is the template. The Wadi Hilweh Information Center documents more than 1,000 exclusion orders barring Palestinians from Al-Aqsa and the Old City since the beginning of 2026. The orders spike before Jewish holidays — more than 40 in a single five-day window in early September. Recipients include worshippers, religious figures, Islamic Waqf employees, teachers associated with study circles, and funeral attendees. Ibrahim al-Natsheh was arrested at his cousin's funeral prayers and handed a six-month ban with no specific charge. The cited justification: "disturbing the peace." While Palestinian access contracts, Israeli settler presence expands. The Palestinian Authority's Jerusalem Governorate recorded nearly 28,000 settler visits to Al-Aqsa between July and September 2026. These visits now include Jewish prayers, religious rituals, flag-raising, and attempts to bring sacrificial offerings — activities that directly contradict the longstanding status quo under which the Waqf manages Muslim religious affairs while Israeli police handle security and access. The Waqf's operational capacity is being deliberately degraded. Fewer than 15 guards now staff the morning shift, down from approximately 50. Israeli police prevent Waqf officials from accompanying Jewish groups inside the compound, have arrested or barred employees, and blocked restoration work at the Bab al-Rahma prayer hall and maintenance of the compound's trees and gardens. The restoration committee has been unable to function for years. The 40-day closure of Al-Aqsa during the US-Israel war on Iran — from February 28 to April 9 — was imposed without consulting or notifying the Waqf. This was not a security measure negotiated between co-administrators. It was a unilateral decision by one party against another, revealing that the Waqf's administrative role has become largely ceremonial. Several proposals now circulate to formalize what is happening on the ground: allowing Jewish visitors on Saturdays, dividing access between Muslims and Jews at different parts of the compound, and an Israeli police recruitment drive for volunteers to escort settler incursions. Each proposal moves the baseline further from shared governance toward partition — a model that would effectively end Muslim administrative authority at the site. The pattern is legible: restrict Palestinian access through individual exclusion orders, degrade the institutional capacity of the Waqf, normalize settler religious activity under police protection, then present the new reality as the status quo. The question is not whether this is happening — the numbers are explicit. The question is what institutional arrangement, if any, replaces what is being dismantled.
