Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told Al Jazeera that Israel plans to establish a naval base in Berbera and use its airport — and that Mogadishu will resist this "under any circumstances." The port city sits on the Gulf of Aden coast in Somaliland, the self-declared republic that Israel recognised in December, making it the first and only UN member state to do so. Mohamud frames the Israeli interest as strategic positioning near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, not development aid or partnership. The geometry matters. Berbera faces Yemen across a narrow stretch of water where the Iran-aligned Houthis have enforced blockades on Israel-linked shipping. An Israeli naval presence there would create a second military vector on the strait — complementary to existing US and coalition assets — and would place Israeli forces within direct operational range of both Houthi positions and Iranian naval activity. Mohamud described Israel as a "destabilising force" and linked the Berbera plans to the broader "Greater Israel" concept, citing Netanyahu's August 2025 statement of personal connection to that vision. The Somaliland recognition is the wedge. For over three decades, Somaliland governed itself without international recognition. Israel's unilateral move broke that consensus and, from Mogadishu's perspective, violated Somali sovereignty to secure a military foothold. Mohamud asserts that Somaliland's own residents oppose an Israeli presence, though the self-declared republic's government clearly engaged with the recognition process. The recognition creates a legal and diplomatic grey zone that Israel can operate within while Somalia contests it. Mohamud's wider regional positioning is pragmatic. He named the US as Somalia's strongest counterterrorism partner, claimed al-Shabab has been pushed out of major cities, and struck a conciliatory tone on Ethiopia's landlocked access — saying Mogadishu doesn't object to Addis Ababa using Somali ports under joint agreements. This is a significant softening from the January 2024 crisis when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding directly with Somaliland on sea access, which Somalia condemned. The diplomatic calculus is clear: isolate the Israeli-Somaliland axis while keeping other regional relationships functional. On the Houthis, Mohamud accused the group of "destabilising the region" and disrupting navigation — language that aligns him with Saudi Arabia and the US rather than with Iran's network. The Houthis have intensified attacks on Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Crown Prince MBS has promised no compromise on security. Mohamud is choosing sides in the Red Sea contest, positioning Somalia as a stabilising partner rather than a vacuum that external powers exploit. The structural question is whether Somalia can enforce any of this. Mogadishu does not control Somaliland. Al-Shabab still holds territory in southern and central Somalia despite Mohamud's claims of urban containment. The federal government's writ is contested domestically, which means the strongest card Mohamud can play is diplomatic — rallying Arab and African opposition to the recognition and denying Israel legitimacy on the ground. If Israeli infrastructure actually materialises in Berbera, Somalia's options narrow to protest or proxy pressure. What's unfolding is a multi-sided competition for control of the Horn of Africa's coastline and the Red Sea's southern chokepoint. Israel wants forward positioning. The Houthis want denial. Saudi Arabia and the UAE want stability. Ethiopia wants port access. Somalia wants sovereignty. These interests don't align, and Berbera — a small port city most people couldn't find on a map — has become the intersection point for all of them.
