
LEADERS · FIRST TRILATERAL
3
SHARED OBJECTIVES
0
SINCE YALTA 1945
80 yrs
LIKELY FORMAT
G2+1
On November 19, the leaders of China, the United States, and Russia will sit down together in Shenzhen for the first formal trilateral meeting of the three powers — ever. The meeting takes place on the sidelines of the APEC summit, and Putin himself proposed it during an October call with Trump. Moscow's commentariat has already christened it the 'new Yalta.' The comparison is structurally false.
Extraction Map
The 1945 Yalta Conference succeeded — to the extent it did — because Britain, the USSR, and the US had just won a war together and needed to administer the aftermath. The three powers arriving in Shenzhen share no common enemy, no common victory, and no common vision for world order. All three speak of 'multipolarity,' but they mean fundamentally different things by it. Moscow wants to be one of several great-power poles in Eurasia. Washington wants to remain the pre-eminent power, full stop. Beijing wants to pull the Global South out of the American orbit. Trump's preferred framing — the 'G2' — explicitly sidelines Russia, which is exactly the outcome Putin is trying to prevent. The economic divergence is even starker. Russia has fallen decades behind the US and China in semiconductors, mobile communications, space exploration, robotics, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence. Its economy has archaised under sanctions and war footing. Meanwhile, the US and China are locked in a genuine technological competition across every frontier sector. Russia's remaining claim to great-power status rests almost entirely on its nuclear arsenal — which is precisely why Putin would resist nuclear disarmament talks, and why Trump's preferred agenda lands awkwardly. Each leader wants the summit to be about something different. Trump wants nuclear disarmament — a non-starter for China, which has the smallest arsenal of the three, and unwelcome in Moscow. Putin wants to settle the Ukraine war without Ukrainians or Europeans present, but his maximalist demands — demonstrated in Abu Dhabi and Moscow consultations — require changes to the European order that violate international law and would alienate Beijing, which cannot afford to endorse sovereignty violations as a general principle. Xi, for his part, is likely to yield no more than a general declaration on cooperation. For Xi, the summit is the real prize regardless of substance. China is hosting the leaders of the two states it spent the better part of a century looking up to — first as a Soviet dependent, then as the most effective student of the US-led liberal economic order. That China now dominates global manufacturing and trade, has the fastest-growing economy of the three, and leads in multiple technology races makes the symbolism unmistakable. The author draws a sharp contrast between Xi's composure and his counterparts' entanglements in wars they cannot win or exit. The most plausible outcome is not a new world order but the foundation of a recurring trilateral format, maintained for different reasons by each participant. Trump uses it to sideline traditional allies. Putin uses it to perform great-power status. Xi uses it to institutionalise what the author calls a 'G2+1' — where Russia is the '+1' that gets dropped once the Ukraine war ends and the world's attention to the Kremlin fades. Little of substance would emerge from such meetings. The author's sharpest observation is generational. Xi, Trump, and Putin belong to an outgoing cohort of leaders driven less by ideology or vision than by memory, nostalgia, old phobias, and prejudice. The piece closes with the possibility that — as after the original Yalta — these leaders will leave power and a new generation will take their place. Whether that generation leads the world into a 'better future' is left as aspiration, not analysis.
Worth reading?
SKIP
Score
20
/100
Extractive — the summit format consolidates decision-making among three nuclear powers while excluding affected parties (Ukraine, Europe, the Global South), generating no new institutional capacity.
What Is GRIN?
GRIN stands for Generativity, Resilience, Innovation efficiency, and Novelty openness. These four dimensions capture the essential characteristics of any memetic intelligence — whether a nation, a corporation, a religion, or a movement.
About GRINGenerativity
1/5
Resilience
1/5
Efficiency
1/5
Novelty
1/5
Extractive
4/5
Inverted
Does this create new capability or just redistribute existing value?
Near-zero generativity. No new institutions, treaties, or frameworks are plausible. Each leader seeks to extract status or legitimacy from the format, not build shared capability.
Verified Facts (7)
On November 19, the leaders of China, the United States and Russia will gather for a trilateral meeting in Shenzhen on the sidelines of an annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.
Putin proposed the trilateral meeting during a call with US President Donald Trump in October.
In 1945, the Soviet Union, the US and Britain came together after emerging victorious from the second world war.
Trump has said he would prefer to address nuclear disarmament.
China has the smallest nuclear arsenal of the three countries.
From the late 1940s, China was highly dependent on the USSR.
With the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s, Beijing gradually became the most talented disciple of the US-led West.
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