Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defended a second consecutive night of US military strikes on Iran, framing the campaign as a form of coercive diplomacy. 'Negotiate with bombs' was the phrase he used — not a slip, but a stated doctrine. US Central Command described the attacks as a response to 'Iran's unwarranted and continued aggression,' a framing that positions the strikes as defensive rather than escalatory. The language matters: 'continued aggression' implies an open-ended justification for further action without a defined endpoint. The doctrinal shift here is significant. Coercive diplomacy — using force to compel behavior change rather than to destroy capability — has a long and mostly unsuccessful track record. The theory requires a credible threat that can be turned off, which demands clear communication of demands and a visible path to de-escalation. None of that architecture is evident in Hegseth's public statements. Back-to-back strike nights signal something beyond a one-off retaliatory action. This is a sustained campaign tempo, which changes the calculus for Iran, for regional actors, and for global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz remains the world's most important oil chokepoint, and any Iranian response that threatens shipping lanes would produce immediate global economic consequences. The domestic political context is inseparable from the military one. A Defense Secretary publicly branding airstrikes as negotiation positions the administration for a cycle where escalation becomes its own justification — each Iranian response becomes the 'continued aggression' that warrants the next round of strikes. For allies and adversaries reading the signals, the message is that the US has shifted from deterrence-by-threat to deterrence-by-punishment, with no articulated conditions under which strikes would stop. That is not a negotiating posture. It is an escalation posture wearing diplomatic language. The question that matters now is not whether these strikes are militarily effective — it is whether any off-ramp exists, who has the authority to take it, and whether the domestic political incentives favor finding one.