The June quarter wage price index landed with a thud: private-sector wages grew just 0.7% for the quarter, the weakest reading since December 2021. Annualized, that pace would deliver 2.8% growth — well below inflation, extending a real-wage decline that has now erased 17 years of purchasing power gains. The Reserve Bank of Australia's own forecasts suggest workers won't claw back to 2011-era real wages until at least December 2028, if then. The timing is instructive. In the same June quarter that wages flatlined, the RBA raised interest rates, citing among its reasons the "risk" of wages going up. Private-sector wage growth at the time was already running at its slowest pace in nearly six years. The annual figure slowed from 3.2% in March to 3.1% in June — the weakest since June 2022. Only public-sector wage growth in healthcare and public administration kept the headline number from falling further. The data demolishes the "tight labour market" narrative that has underpinned RBA hawkishness. Construction — the sector supposedly straining under AI datacentre demand and a nationwide worker shortage — still saw wages grow slower than inflation. Across every single industry measured by the ABS, inflation outpaced wage growth over the past year. The supposed wage-price spiral exists nowhere in the data. Meanwhile, the corporate sector tells a different story entirely. NAB posted a 5% profit increase year-on-year. CBA reported a 7% rise in cash profit. BHP delivered 9% annual profit growth. Rio Tinto recorded a 47% profit surge in the first half of 2026, driven by soaring copper prices. These are not firms being squeezed by labour costs. The ABS found that 79% of jobs receiving a wage change in the June quarter had annual growth below 4% — the highest share since 2022. The vast majority of wage agreements are settling at levels consistent with sub-3% inflation, exactly where the RBA says it wants them. Workers are doing precisely what the central bank demands, and getting punished for it with rate hikes anyway. The structural picture is now clear: the loss of real wages is permanent. Any attempt to recover lost ground — or even the suggestion of it — triggers RBA concern about inflation risk, which translates to higher interest rates, which further compresses real purchasing power through mortgage costs. Corporate profits face no equivalent scrutiny. A 47% profit increase at Rio Tinto is praised as economic strength; a 3.1% wage increase is treated as a threat. This is a policy regime that has locked in a one-directional transfer from labour to capital. The mechanism is the RBA's asymmetric reaction function: wages rising toward inflation trigger tightening, but profits rising multiples above inflation trigger nothing. Twenty years of this produces a society where the median worker is structurally poorer and the institutional response to any correction is to make them poorer still.