Democrats' Two Levers: War Powers and the Debt Ceiling as Affordability Tools

Economist Mark Zandi identifies two narrow windows for the new Democratic Congress: pressure to end the Iran war (costing families $2,200) and debt-ceiling leverage to restore ACA subsidies and reverse Medicaid/SNAP cuts.

Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi has laid out the tactical arithmetic facing the incoming Democratic majority after the party's sweeping 2026 midterm victory. The question voters are asking — what can Democrats actually do about the affordability crisis that turned them against Republicans — has a narrower answer than most winners would like to admit.

Zandi identifies two specific levers. The first is the Iran war. Through hearings, oversight, and War Powers Resolution votes, the new Congress can apply real pressure to end a conflict Zandi estimates has cost the average American household $2,200 through cascading oil-price increases. That figure has been climbing as the war drags on and energy costs propagate through supply chains into groceries, transport, and heating. Zandi believes the post-election political environment makes an end to the war more plausible, though he concedes most legislative changes still require Donald Trump's cooperation. The second lever is the debt ceiling — but only if Republicans fail to raise it themselves before the new Congress is seated in January. If the current Republican-controlled Congress passes a budget reconciliation package and lifts the debt limit before the lame-duck session expires, Democrats lose this bargaining chip entirely. If Republicans cannot get it done — and Zandi rates that probability as high, given the party's thin House majority and post-election demoralization — then Trump will need Democratic votes. That creates leverage to demand restoration of enhanced ACA subsidies and reversal of cuts to SNAP and Medicaid. The conditional nature of both levers is worth emphasizing. The war lever requires presidential cooperation. The debt-ceiling lever requires Republican failure in the lame-duck session. Neither is a legislative initiative Democrats can execute unilaterally. This is leverage politics, not governance — the minority party extracting concessions from a weakened executive rather than building new policy architecture. The structural picture is familiar: an affordability crisis driven by external shock (war-driven energy prices) compounded by domestic policy choices (healthcare and safety-net cuts). The costs flow downward to households. The available remedies are indirect — ending a war to lower oil prices, or trading debt-ceiling votes for restored transfer payments. Neither addresses the deeper affordability drivers: housing costs, healthcare system pricing, or wage-productivity gaps. Zandi's framing is pragmatic rather than transformative. He is describing what the next Congress can realistically accomplish within severe institutional constraints, not what would solve the affordability crisis. The honest read is that Democrats have two shots at partial relief — one geopolitical, one procedural — and both depend on variables outside their control. The midterm results reflect voter anger at economic pain, but the tools available to the winners are blunt instruments aimed at symptoms. If the Iran war ends, energy costs drop. If debt-ceiling leverage works, some safety-net cuts get reversed. Neither outcome restructures the affordability equation. The 20-year question is whether this cycle — crisis, backlash election, narrow tactical relief — becomes the permanent mode of American economic governance.