Albania's Special Anti-Corruption Structure, SPAK, has delivered what years of reform promised: criminal proceedings against a former president, a former prime minister, the mayor of Tirana, two ex-deputy prime ministers, and now the dismissed head of the State Intelligence Service, Vlora Hyseni, arrested on charges of aiding a suspect and leaking investigative secrets. These are separate cases, but they share a common thread — alleged abuse of public power at the highest levels. The Hyseni case emerged from a wider probe into the National Agency for Information Society (AKSHI), which oversees much of Albania's digital public infrastructure. Prosecutors allege she exploited her position as intelligence chief to help a person wanted in that investigation. She turned herself in on September 22 while attending an intelligence conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, and remains under house arrest. The prosecution wave represents a genuine institutional shift. Political scientist Afrim Krasniqi frames it plainly: the 2016 justice reform was designed to end impunity for senior officials, and SPAK is now delivering on that mandate. Lawyer Dorian Matlija of Res Publica agrees the institutional reaction has changed fundamentally — SPAK has greater independence, stronger capacities, and international support. The myth of untouchability is broken. But prosecution is reactive by definition. By the time SPAK acts, the damage is done. Matlija identifies the real deficit: 'We are becoming more effective at punishing corruption after it has occurred, but much less capable of preventing it.' The European Commission's 2025 report on Albania echoes this precisely — praising SPAK's track record while noting that the institutional framework for prevention 'continued to have a limited impact.' Administrative controls, audits, conflict-of-interest rules, and asset declarations remain ineffective. The numbers confirm the gap between prosecution spectacle and lived reality. A 2023 SELDI survey found 52% of Albanian respondents had experienced corruption pressure from public officials, and 40% reported having paid a bribe. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows Albania improving from 33 points in 2012 to 39 in 2025 — progress, but still below every EU member state. Krasniqi locates the structural cause in Albania's political architecture. Edi Rama's Socialist Party has governed since 2013 with an outright parliamentary majority. 'We have a deformed system,' Krasniqi says. 'The head of the executive controls the executive, parliament and institutions.' This concentration of power, he argues, has enabled informal networks of influence where people outside state institutions shape legislation and public asset allocation. Rama's consistent response — that criminal responsibility is individual — sidesteps the systemic critique entirely. The EU dimension adds both incentive and pressure. Albania met interim benchmarks for the 'fundamentals' cluster in May 2025 and has moved into an implementation phase. Matlija credits the EU process with strengthening SPAK's independence. But as Krasniqi argues, the real measure of European integration is not formal accession milestones — it is whether Albanian society itself changes, delivering greater social security, prosperity, and institutional independence to citizens rather than checking boxes.
