Saudi Arabia's flagship economic transformation is colliding with a threat its military spending cannot neutralize. Since July, Houthi forces have escalated missile and drone attacks across the border, disrupting schools, threatening energy infrastructure, and pushing the kingdom's 1,200-kilometer East-West pipeline offline — the very pipeline that became critical after Strait of Hormuz shipping routes grew precarious due to the US-Israel-Iran conflict. The Houthis have simultaneously expanded territorial control along Yemen's coast and seized Red Sea islands, giving them oversight of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Combined with pipeline disruptions, this amounts to what Carnegie's Andrew Leber calls a "one-two punch" — Saudi Arabia's two alternative oil export routes are now both compromised, potentially forcing shipments back through the still-restricted Hormuz corridor. The military asymmetry is stark. Saudi Arabia spends enormous sums on modern weapons systems, yet the Houthis do not need to win a conventional war. Missiles and drones targeting infrastructure and shipping lanes are sufficient to impose unacceptable costs on a kingdom that needs stability above all else. A Saudi-led coalition fought the Houthis from 2015 to 2022 with US and UAE support and failed to achieve decisive victory. Allied support is conspicuously thin. Washington has offered intelligence and reconnaissance but not direct military engagement, partly because US forces face reported shortages of sophisticated interceptors, Patriot missiles, and cruise missiles after the sustained campaign against Iran. The Council on Foreign Relations argues that resolving the Houthi threat requires a large coordinated ground operation — something neither Washington nor Riyadh appears willing to undertake. European involvement remains cosmetic. France announced soldiers, radar systems, and air defense for the Red Sea port of Yanbu, and Italy has signaled naval escorts for its merchant ships. Operation Aspides has protected some shipping since early 2024. But experts are blunt: none of this alters the strategic balance. The recently formed Mecca alliance with Turkey and Pakistan carries similar limitations — both partners are reluctant to confront Iran directly. Diplomacy may be the only viable path, though its track record is poor. The Houthis have genuine economic reasons to engage — Yemen depends on Saudi Arabia for humanitarian aid and as a labor market for migrant workers. But Saudi efforts to curb Houthi influence through diplomacy and by uniting fractured Yemeni government forces have been overtaken by the militia's territorial advance. The structural problem is clear: Vision 2030 was designed for a stable regional environment that does not exist. Every month of Houthi escalation erodes investor confidence, threatens energy revenues that fund the transition, and demonstrates that Saudi military power cannot secure the conditions its own modernization requires. The kingdom is caught between a war it cannot win and a peace it cannot negotiate from strength.
