The US-Iran war is nine months old and locked in a logic of attrition that neither side can escape without costs it considers existential. Three analysts interviewed by DW converge on a bleak assessment: the US midterm elections may rearrange the domestic political furniture, but the war's trajectory depends on structural factors — nuclear ambiguity, energy chokepoints, proxy networks, and the absence of a diplomatic framework — that Congress cannot simply legislate away. A Democratic takeover of Congress would expose the financial costs of the war to public scrutiny and increase pressure on Trump to seek an exit. But as Babak Rezaeedaryakenari of Leiden University notes, the president retains broad authority over military operations regardless of who controls the legislature. Trump's pattern — escalate, declare victory, move on — remains the most likely playbook. Omid Memarian of DAWN warns that Trump could launch a massive attack, inflict serious damage, and then claim the win, with or without congressional blessing. The nuclear impasse remains the structural core of the standoff. The US demands Iran's nuclear program be on the table from the start of negotiations. Iran demands sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets before any nuclear talks begin. Neither side has moved. Memarian describes this as 'climbing the ladder of tension' — each side believing that inflicting more pain will improve its position at the table. The logic is self-reinforcing and inherently escalatory. Israel's October 27 election added a new variable without resolving anything. Neither Netanyahu's coalition nor Gadi Eisenkot's camp secured a majority. Memarian flags the transition period as the 'most fragile and dangerous' window for renewed escalation, as Netanyahu may act on major decisions while he still holds power. Even a change of government wouldn't fundamentally alter Israel's Iran posture — the security establishment's concerns about Tehran transcend any single leader. Iran's leverage over the Strait of Hormuz — through which 20% of global oil flowed before the war — is a double-edged weapon. Tehran has restricted energy exports through the chokepoint, but Memarian argues this alone won't trigger US escalation. The more dangerous scenario: if Washington decides a broader attack is needed, any Hormuz incident becomes a pretext. Meanwhile, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and Saudi infrastructure add a parallel pressure track. Rezaeedaryakenari warns these attacks could 'narrow the Islamic Republic's room for maneuver' by pushing regional states toward closer military cooperation. Regional mediators — Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia — remain engaged but constrained. All four want to maintain ties with both Washington and Tehran. Morovati warns that continued US failure to support its Arab allies during the war could push them toward rival powers. The economic toll is mounting on all sides, but neither Iran nor the US has reached the point where compromise feels unavoidable. As Morovati puts it: 'The economy is the Achilles' heel of every party to this war.' The window Memarian identifies — between now and Trump's departure in January 2029 — is the best opportunity for a deal, but the incentive structure is perverse. Iran's leaders believe a Republican defeat would increase pressure on Trump, so they've deliberately prolonged talks. Trump needs a face-saving exit. Each side calculates that the other will blink first. That calculus has produced nine months of war and counting.
