Britain's smart meter data network — the backbone connecting 39.2 million devices across 23 million homes and small businesses — has quietly changed hands. Smart DCC, a subsidiary of crisis-hit outsourcing giant Capita, has surrendered control after its 13-year licence expired. The replacement is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Smart Energy Code Company (SECCo), structured as a not-for-profit with an independent board. Capita was effectively blocked from tendering for the new licence. The transition is the end of a model that never worked as promised. Ministers originally expected universal smart meter coverage before 2020. Instead, three in 10 households still lack a meter, nearly a third of installed meters weren't working properly as of 2024 according to Citizens Advice, and the National Audit Office estimates another £1.7 billion may be needed to finish the rollout. The original 2013 commercial framework was designed to let a private operator profit from building critical national infrastructure. The profit arrived. The infrastructure lagged. Capita's stewardship was marked by procurement opacity. The industry regulator Ofgem opened an investigation last summer into Smart DCC's contracts, finding deals awarded without competitive process — including one granted to Capita itself. Smart DCC paid £200,000 into a consumer redress fund in July, the same week Capita apologised for its mishandling of the Civil Service Pension Scheme. These are not isolated incidents. Capita's market capitalisation has collapsed by 97% over the past decade as its outsourcing empire unravelled across multiple government contracts. The new operator promises "a greater focus on cost, transparency and customer and consumer needs." Its board includes Dame Gillian Guy, former chief executive of Citizens Advice — the same organisation that publicly stated households had been "let down" by the rollout. The appointment signals that consumer accountability is at least being performed. Whether it's structural or cosmetic depends on governance details not yet public. The core tension here is that smart meters are not optional infrastructure. They are the prerequisite for time-of-use tariffs, demand response, and the integration of distributed renewable energy into a grid that was designed for centralised coal and gas. Every year the network underperforms is a year the energy transition runs on outdated plumbing. The £1.7 billion in additional costs needed to finish the rollout is money that could have funded actual grid upgrades if the original rollout had been competently managed. Capita's spokesperson framed the handover as a success: 99.6% network availability, 39.2 million connected meters. This is the classic outsourcer's defence — cite the operational metric while ignoring the strategic failure. A network that is available but incomplete, with a third of its meters malfunctioning, is not a success. It is a billing system that works for the operator and fails for the public. The shift to a non-profit model is the right structural move, but it arrives a decade late and billions over budget. The lesson is familiar: when governments outsource critical infrastructure buildout to commercial operators with misaligned incentives, the public pays twice — once for the contract and again for the cleanup.
