Israel's announcement that it will close the British consulate in East Jerusalem on 8 October — retaliation for the UK's sweeping ban on settlement trade — runs headlong into a legal wall that former attorney general Dominic Grieve has now mapped in detail for the Foreign Office. The core argument is straightforward: East Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory under international law, recognised as such by the UN, the UK, and the international court of justice. An occupying power does not possess the sovereign authority to expel foreign diplomatic missions from territory it occupies. The British consulate in Jerusalem predates the state of Israel by more than a century, established in 1838. It operates independently of the UK embassy in Tel Aviv, with its own staff and a distinct diplomatic mandate covering Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. The consul general reports directly to the Foreign Office. This is not a subsidiary operation — it is the UK's primary diplomatic channel to Palestine. Grieve's advisory paper, submitted through the British Palestine Project, argues the UK government has a legal duty to oppose the closure. He points to the UK's formal acceptance of the ICJ's July 2024 advisory opinion that Israel's presence in occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful. Closing the consulate, Grieve argues, would be another Israeli attempt to create facts on the ground — exercising powers beyond those permitted to an occupier — and should be challenged in court. The practical dimension is blunt. Foreign Office minister Lord Wood acknowledged in the Lords that while the legal position may favour the UK, Israel could de facto render the consulate inoperable. Israel's military occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza means diplomats need Israeli accreditation to function. When Israel revoked Norwegian diplomatic credentials in 2024 after Norway recognised Palestine, Norway was forced to close its West Bank mission entirely and run Palestinian relations from Jordan. Israel is now applying the same playbook to the Netherlands. Foreign minister Gideon Sa'ar announced the revocation of Dutch diplomatic credentials from their mission to Palestine, responding to the Netherlands' ban on settlement imports that took effect 22 September. Sa'ar suggested Dutch diplomats could operate from Palestinian Authority territory rather than 'the territory of the state of Israel' — asserting the very sovereignty over East Jerusalem that the UN Security Council has expressly said Israel does not possess. Grieve frames the consulate closure as falling primarily on Palestinians, not Britain. The consulate provides aid coordination, oversight, and reporting from the West Bank and Gaza. Shutting it down degrades the UK's capacity to monitor conditions in occupied territory — which is precisely the point. The pattern is consistent: Israel uses diplomatic retaliation not merely to punish individual states but to thin the international presence that documents and constrains its occupation. The strategic question is whether legal arguments can outrun physical control. Israel holds the keys to accreditation, border access, and operational logistics in the territories. The UK can challenge the closure in court, as Grieve recommends, but the Norwegian precedent shows what happens when legal rights collide with an occupying power willing to ignore them. The gap between what international law says and what Israel can enforce on the ground is the entire story.
