Britain maintains the most overseas-oriented military among European NATO members, spending roughly 23% of its defence budget — over £14bn in 2024-25 — on commitments spanning five continents. That is the central finding of a new report from the Transition Security Project, a research centre spun out of Common Wealth, the thinktank with close ties to Andy Burnham. The report lands just as the government commits to a headline-grabbing target of 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035. The numbers are stark. The defence budget is set to roughly double in nominal terms, from £70bn in 2026 to £151bn by 2035. Since 2001, the UK has spent more than £51bn in modern terms on military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere — operations the report characterises as having frequently made the world less safe. About £2.8bn annually goes to bases in Cyprus, Kenya, Oman and other locations maintained as 'strategic hubs' for projecting UK military power. The report's core argument is sequencing: change posture before increasing spending. Pouring new money into the existing global force-projection structure, the authors argue, will entrench a procurement system already notorious for waste. The Defence Investment Plan unveiled in July under Starmer's premiership appears to confirm that fear, signalling continued commitments on multiple continents rather than a reorientation toward European defence. Political context sharpens the stakes. John Healey resigned as defence secretary over a refusal to commit to reaching 3% of GDP by 2030. Now chancellor, Healey has shelved that interim target. The gap between the 2035 ambition and the current pace of spending creates a window where posture decisions will lock in for a decade. Defence officials privately acknowledge the risk that an arbitrary spending target could worsen waste rather than reduce it. The Transition Security Project positions itself against US alignment as a guiding principle for UK defence. Co-author Kevin Cashman warns against pouring money into 'a bloated military sector geared towards alignment with the United States while Washington starts wars around the world that drive up our bills.' Co-director Khem Rogaly frames the overseas spending as a symbol of outdated foreign policy, arguing resources should shift to health, housing and climate. The structural question the report raises is genuine even if its political framing is contestable. Whether or not one agrees that overseas bases are wasteful, the mismatch between stated priorities (preparing for a possible European war) and actual budget allocation (global force projection) is a measurable inefficiency. The government's own defence officials acknowledge the importance of matching spending to need rather than to an arbitrary GDP percentage. What the report does not do is model what retrenchment would cost in alliance credibility, intelligence sharing, or basing rights that underpin European defence logistics. That omission matters. A serious rebalancing argument needs a ledger with both columns filled in — the cost of staying and the cost of leaving.
