Yemen's UN-recognised government under President Rashad al-Alimi has carried out a wave of political and military dismissals in a bid to arrest a collapsing battlefield position. The counteroffensive launched on 5 October — designed to liberate the country from Houthi control — has failed outright, with thousands dead and no territorial gains despite Saudi air superiority. Houthi forces are now reported to be just 37 miles (60km) from Aden, the government's nominal seat. The reshuffles target both incompetence and political imbalance. Yusuf al-Sharaji, the military figure responsible for the Taiz front, was sacked amid widespread accusations of operational failure that led to the loss of several districts to the Houthis. Abu Bakr al-Jabouli, a brigadier on the Tor al-Baha axis, was also removed. Maj Gen Rashad al-Yousfi, a career officer, now holds the task of lifting the four-week siege of Taiz, Yemen's third largest city. On the political side, Alimi replaced the long-serving information minister Muammar al-Eryani with Prof Salem al-Awlaki, a former STC spokesperson — a clear signal to southern Yemenis whose troops have become indispensable to the government's defence. Two other southerners were named to cabinet positions, and new leadership was installed at the civil aviation authority, Aden's ports, and the transport ministry. The presidential leadership council met in Riyadh for the first time in months, underscoring how far removed the government is from the territory it claims to govern. The north-south faultline is now the government's central strategic problem. Southern forces insist they will fight only to defend land within the borders of former South Yemen (pre-1990 unification). The banned Southern Transitional Council (STC) is growing bolder, with fresh claims that Saudi Arabia coerced STC leaders into dissolving the organisation. STC officials are now openly criticising Riyadh in the media — a sign they believe the north may already be lost and that the Saudis will eventually have to let them operate freely. Intra-coalition fractures are accelerating. Abu Zara'a, leader of the Southern Giants brigade, has reportedly fallen out with the Saudi-funded Homeland Shield Forces affiliated with Abdulrahman al-Lahji. After heavy losses, al-Lahji filed an official report accusing Abu Zara'a of treason and warning that the situation in Dhubab — near the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait — had become extremely dangerous for the government. Repeated claims that control of the strait had been retaken from the Houthis were contradicted by the evidence. The structural picture is grim. The government is salary-dependent on Saudi money, its most senior figures operate from Riyadh hotels rather than Yemeni soil, and its fighting coalition is fragmenting along north-south, tribal, and personal lines. Saudi air superiority has not translated into ground control. The Houthis are advancing. The reshuffle addresses symptoms — sacking failed commanders, courting southern allies — without changing the underlying dynamic: a government with no independent revenue, no territorial depth, and no unified command structure. The 20-year question is whether Yemen reconsolidates or formalises its division. Every month of Houthi advance and southern separatist confidence makes reunification harder to imagine. The current trajectory points toward a de facto partition with the Houthis controlling the north and a fractious southern entity negotiating its relationship with Riyadh — with the Bab al-Mandab strait's control hanging in the balance for global shipping.
